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The exclusionary rule requires suppression of relevant evidence if
the court finds that the evidence was unlawfully obtained by law en-
forcement officials.' The rule most often is invoked because of a search
or seizure in violation of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution or of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.2
* District Attorney, Los Angeles County. B.A., 1956, Dartmouth College; 3.D., 1959,
Stanford Law School.
** Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles County. B.A., 1969, Dartmouth College;
J.D., 1973, Harvard Law School.
1. The exclusionary rule may also exclude relevant evidence lawfully obtained by
such officials when its admission would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. See,
e.g., People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 605 P.2d 843, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980). In Rucker, the
court held that, although a waiver of the accused's constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is not a prerequisite to a legitimate booking interview,
without such a waiver the admission of the accused's responses in a subsequent criminal
proceeding against him or her would violate both the state and federal privilege against self-
incrimination. 26 Cal. 3d at 373, 386-89, 605 P.2d at 846, 853-56, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 23-26.
In its interpretation of Miranda in People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 812-13, 427 P.2d
772, 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 111-12 (1967), the California Supreme Court determined that
noncoercive interrogation of an accused in violation of the Miranda requirements is never in
itself unlawful. Illegality arises only if evidence obtained as a result of such interrogation is
used against the accused in a criminal proceeding. The court reasoned: "The basis for the
warnings required by Miranda is the privilege against self-incrimination ... .and that
privilege is not violated when the information elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used
against him." Id. at 812, 427 P.2d at 775, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (citations omitted). The court
distinguished a Miranda violation from "unreasonable searches and seizures, which always
violate the Constitution." Id. at 812, 427 P.2d at 776, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
2. See, ag., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975).
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
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Less frequently, the rule is invoked because of a violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination or right to counsel guaranteed by the
fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution and by
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.
3
The exclusionary rule in general has been the subject of extensive
criticism, and numerous proposals have been made to reform the rule.
4
Critics have claimed that the rule is not an effective deterrent 5 and has
many costs and disadvantages. 6 In particular, the California Supreme
Court has been criticized for invoking nonstatutory independent state
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13 is virtually identical to the fourth amendment: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons and things to be seized."
3. See, e.g., People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1981) (right to counsel); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976) (self-incrimination).
The relevant portion of the fifth amendment provides: "No person... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The relevant portion of the sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
Article 1, § 15 of the California Constitution contains the state counterpart of these
federal provisions: "The defendant in a criminal cause has the right... to have the assist-
ance of counsel for the defendant's defense. . . . Persons may not. . . be compelled in a
criminal cause to be a witness against themselves ...."
4. For a discussion of various proposed reforms, see Van de Kamp, The Exclusionary
Rule.- Promises Not Kept-Proposed Alternatives, 15 THE PROSECUTOR 348 (1980).
5. For a summary of the argument that the exclusionary rule is not an effective deter-
rent, see Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 662-71.
6. Professor Steven R. Schlesinger has summarized some of these costs and disadvan-
tages: "[Tihe rule releases many otherwise guilty persons, some of whom are dangerous or
violent; it diminishes public respect for the legal and judicial system; it fails to distinguish
between more or less serious crimes or between willful, flagrant violations by an officer and
'good-faith' errors committed in difficult circumstances; it excludes the most credible kinds
of evidence; it intensifies plea bargaining, since a questionable search may well be one of the
bargaining points between prosecution and defense; and the rule tends to push the judiciary
toward dangerously expanded notions of what is a legal search in order to admit evidence
which judges are reluctant to suppress." Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Propo-
nents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to Police? 62 JUDICATURE 404, 405 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the application of the exclusionary
rule "deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 490 (1976).
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grounds to exclude relevant evidence. 7 The California Constitution
usually has served as the basis for such exclusion. On occasion, how-
ever, the independent state grounds instead have taken the form of a
judicially declared rule of evidence or criminal procedure. An analysis
of the more important California cases excluding evidence on nonstatu-
tory independent state grounds shows that such exclusion has had a
significant impact in California and that the rationale underlying such
exclusion is questionable. As a result of the California Supreme
Court's reliance on nonstatutory independent state grounds, the state
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal rule.
During the 1981-82 regular session of the California legislature,
two measures were introduced that would reform the California exclu-
sionary rule. One of these measures is Senate Constitutional Amend-
ment 7 (SCA 7),8 which would amend the California Constitution to
prevent California courts from excluding evidence on nonstatutory in-
dependent state grounds in criminal proceedings and juvenile proceed-
ings in which the minor was charged with a criminal offense. In such
proceedings, the exclusion of evidence would be permissible only when
required by the United States Constitution or by a statute enacted by
the state legislature. 9
7. See Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., 4ll Sail and No Atnchor-Judicial Review under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979). See notes 52-53, 67-70, 86
& accompanying text infra.
8. This amendment would add § 28 to article I of the state constitution as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, other than subdivision (b) of § 2
of this article, evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial
and postconviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a crimi-
nal offense, except as provided by statute enacted by the California Legislature or as re-
quired by the United States Constitution." California Constitution article I, § 2b protects
the press from being adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose unpublished information
or the source of any information.
When the California Supreme Court excludes evidence on nonstatutory independent
state grounds, it usually relies on the California Constitution. See notes 13-39 & accompa-
nying text infra. To prohibit such a practice, therefore, the state constitution must itself be
amended.
SCA 7 is accompanied by Senate Bill 1092 (1981). The bill requires the exclusion of
evidence obtained by a peace officer in violation of specified statutes regulating police con-
duct, provided that the defendant has standing to invoke the exclusionary rule under the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. The bill prohibits the vicarious invo-
cation of the rule. For a discussion of the vicarious exclusionary rule, see notes 80-91 &
accompanying text infra.
9. SCA 7 is somewhat similar to a provision in Proposition 8, which will appear on the
June 1982 ballot in California. The provision would add § 28(d) to article I of the Califor-
nia Constitution, to read as follows: "(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by
statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legis-
lature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONMay 1982]
The other proposed reform measure is Assembly Constitutional
Amendment 31 (ACA 31),lo which would amend the California Con-
stitution to establish a "Commission on Law Enforcement." The Com-
mission would adopt standards for the certification of police agencies
that "have established policies and programs that are sufficient to pro-
tect the rights guaranteed by [the California] Constitution and the
United States Constitution and to deter and control unlawful police
conduct."'" The Commission would have the power both to grant and
to revoke certification. If a certified police agency obtained otherwise
admissible evidence, "[t]he remedy of exclusion. . . based upon a vio-
lation of rights guaranteed by [the California] Constitution or the
United States Constitution" would not be invoked in any legal pro-
ceeding.12 An application for certification would be strictly voluntary:
no police agency would be required to seek certification.
SCA 7 and ACA 31 approach reform of the exclusionary rule dif-
ferently. SCA 7 would retain the exclusionary rule in its present form,
and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a
criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall
affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or
constitutional right of the press."
Like SCA 7, Proposition 8 would prevent California courts from excluding evidence on
nonstatutory independent state grounds. In contrast to SCA 7, however, Proposition 8 con-
tains no exception permitting exclusion when required by the United States Constitution. In
addition, whereas SCA 7 permits the exclusion of evidence when required by any statute,
with a few exceptions Proposition 8 permits exclusion only when pursuant to a statute en-
acted by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature after the
passage of Proposition 8.
10. This amendment would add § 23 to article VI of the state constitution as follows:
"(a) The Commission on Law Enforcement shall consist of five members. The Gover-
nor shall appoint the chair of the commission. The Attorney General, the Speaker of the
Assembly, the Senate Rules Committee, and the governing body of the State Bar shall each
make one appointment. All terms are for 10 years.
"A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing power for the remainder of the term.
"(b) The remedy of exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence based upon a violation
of rights guaranteed by this Constitution or the United States Constitution shall not be em-
ployed in any legal proceeding if the evidence has been obtained by a police agency which is
certified by the commission pursuant to this section.
"(c) In order to improve the administration of justice, the commission shall promulgate
standards for certification of police agencies which have established policies and programs
that are sufficient to protect the rights guaranteed by this Constitution and the United States
Constitution and to deter and control unlawful police conduct.
"The commission shall establish a process by which police agencies may seek certifica-
tion under such terms and conditions as the commission deems necessary.
"The commission shall also provide for periodic review of certification and may revoke
such certification as it deems appropriate."
11. ACA 31 (1981).
12. Id.
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but prohibit the exclusion of evidence on nonstatutory independent
state grounds. ACA 31, on the other hand, would abolish completely
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the violation of constitutional
rights by a certified police agency.
This Article contends that SCA 7 is a necessary and effective meas-
ure that would permit the admission of relevant evidence currently ex-
cluded under California law. The admission of this evidence would
help restore trials to what they should be-a search for the truth. ACA
31, on the other hand, is not an appropriate reform of the exclusionary
rule. It is too limited in scope, and its implementation would involve
many complexities and uncertainties. Indeed, the courts would have
the power to prevent its implementation. Even if the courts eventually
accepted ACA 31, litigation over the amendment's validity probably
would substantially delay its implementation.
The Development of Nonstatutory Independent State Grounds
in California
Exclusion Based on the California Constitution When the Evidence Is
Admissible Under the United States Constitution
In a number of decisions, the California Supreme Court has relied
on the California Constitution to exclude evidence admissible under
the United States Constitution. In these cases, the court often has inter-
preted the state constitution as setting a higher standard for police con-
duct than the United States Constitution and has excluded evidence
obtained in violation of this more stringent standard. As a result, po-
lice conduct that is lawful under the United States Constitution has
been found to violate the state constitution.
In People v. Brisendine,13 the seminal case in this area, the state
supreme court refused to follow United States v. Robinson1 4 and Gustaf-
son v. Florida.15 In Robinson and Gustafson, the United States
Supreme Court held that when the police make a lawful custodial ar-
rest for a traffic violation, incident to that arrest they may make a full
search of the arrestee's person. The Court reasoned: "A custodial ar-
rest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."1 6
13. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
14. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
15. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
16. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; see also Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265-66.
May 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In Brisendine, the California Supreme Court held that the warrant-
less search of a plastic opaque bottle found inside a camper's knapsack
was unlawful because the officers failed to provide "specific and ar-
ticulable facts" explaining why such an intrusion was necessary to pro-
tect their safety. 17 The court assumed that the camper was to be treated
like a person under custodial arrest for a traffic violation. Such a
search would have been lawful under Robinson and Gustafson.18 The
California court, however, concluded that article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution imposed a more stringent standard of reasona-
bleness than that imposed by the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution.'
9
Since Brisendine, the California Supreme Court has invoked in-
dependent state constitutional grounds to exclude evidence admissible
under other decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In Franks v.
Delaware,20 the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant
may challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit solely on the
ground that the affiant made deliberate falsehoods or falsehoods with
reckless disregard for the truth.21 Under Franks, such a challenge is
not permitted when the affidavit contains merely negligent false-
hoods.2 2 The federal remedy for deliberate or reckless falsehoods is to
excise them from the affidavit and test the remaining statements for
probable cause.23 In People v. Cook,24 on the other hand, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reaffirmed its pre-Franks holding2 5 that even
merely negligent falsehoods must be excised from the affidavit.2 6 It
also held that the remedy for any intentional or reckless falsehood, re-
gardless of its materiality, is to quash the warrant, thereby excluding
17. 13 Cal. 3d at 544-45, 531 P.2d at 1108, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
18. Id. at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
19. Id. at 552, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Relying on the California Con-
stitution, the California Supreme Court has applied the Brisendine rationale in a number of
subsequent cases. See People v. Maher, 17 Cal. 3d 196, 550 P.2d 1044, 130 Cal. Rptr. 508
(1976) (disallowing body search of person arrested for public intoxication prior to transport-
ing him in a "B-wagon" occupied by other arrestees); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538
P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975) (disallowing body search of persons arrested for public
intoxication prior to actual incarceration); People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237,
123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975) (invalidating the warrantless search of a tobacco pouch dropped
by a traffic arrestee).
20. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
21. Id. at 155-56.
22. Id. at 171.
23. Id. at 171-72.
24. 22 Cal. 3d 67, 88, 583 P.2d 130, 142, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605, 617 (1978).
25. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
26. People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d at 74, 583 P.2d at 133, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
[Vol. 32
any evidence obtained through the execution of the warrant.27 In set-
ting a higher standard than that required by Franks, the court in Cook
relied on article I, section 13 of the state constitution.
28
In Smith v. Mfaryland,29 the United States Supreme Court held that
the installation and use of a pen register to record the numbers dialed
from the defendant's home telephone did not constitute a "search"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.30 Notwithstanding
Smith, in People v. Blair,31 the California Supreme Court held that
without legal process, the police may not lawfully obtain from a hotel
employee a list of telephone calls made by a guest at the hotel.32 In
excluding the evidence obtained from the hotel employee, the Blair
court expressly relied on article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution.
33
Under the United States Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. Illi-
nois,34 the federal Constitution guarantees the right to counsel at a
lineup only after the defendant is indicted.3 5 Refusing to follow Kirby,
the California Supreme Court in People v. Bustamante6 held that arti-
cle I, section 15 of the California Constitution 37 also guarantees the
right to counsel at a preindictment lineup.3 8 The court concluded that
its holding required the exclusion of identification testimony based on a
preindictment lineup at which the right to counsel had been denied.
39
In addition, on state constitutional grounds, the California court
has excluded a defendant's prior statements that would have been held
admissible by the United States Supreme Court. In Harris v. New
27. Id. at 74, 583 P.2d at 133, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
28. Id. at 88, 583 P.2d at 142, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 617. In People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d
376, 618 P.2d 213, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), the California
Supreme Court extended the Cook rationale to factual omissions in a search warrant affida-
vit. The court held that when the omission was intentionally made for the purpose of de-
ceiving the magistrate or was made with reckless disregard for the truth, the remedy "is to
quash the warrant regardless of whether the omission ultimately is deemed material." Id. at
390, 618 P.2d at 222, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 676. As in Cook, the court in Kurland relied solely on
California law. .d. at 383 n.2, 618 P.2d at 217 n.2, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 671 n.2.
29. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
30. Id. at 745-46.
31. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
32. Id. at 653-54, 602 P.2d at 746-47, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
33. Id. at 655, 602 P.2d at 748, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
34. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
35. Id. at 690.
36. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
37. See note 3 supra.
38. 30 Cal. 3d at 102, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
39. Id. at 102-03, 634 P.2d at 936, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
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York, 40 the United States Supreme Court permitted the admission of
prior statements made in violation of a defendant's rights under Mi-
randa v. Arizona 41 to impeach that defendant once he or she had cho-
sen to take the stand.42 Relying on the state constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, 43 in People v. Disbrow," the California
Supreme Court refused to allow such prior statements to be used for
impeachment purposes.
In Michigan v. Mosley,45 the United States Supreme Court permit-
ted the admission of a defendant's statements made after he had
waived his constitutional rights, even though earlier that same day he
had invoked his right to remain silent.46 The Court reasoned that the
admission of the statements did not violate the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution because the defendant's " 'right to cut off
questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' "47 In People v. Pettingill,
48
however, the California Supreme Court excluded a defendant's state-
ments made under similar circumstances. 49 The court in Pettingill con-
ceded that its decision was contrary to Mosley, which it declined to
follow on the ground that Mosley provided less protection than that
guaranteed by the California constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
50
The California Supreme Court has been criticized for its practice
40. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. 401 U.S. at 224-26.
43. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See note 3 supra.
44. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
45. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
46. Id. at 107.
47. Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
48. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
49. Id. at 246, 578 P.2d at 117, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
50. Id. at 246-49, 578 P.2d at 117-19, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 870-72. It has been suggested
that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), bears striking similarities to the California decision in Pettingill. See CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS OF SCA 7, at 4 (July 6, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SCA 7 BILL ANALYSIS]. The two cases, however, are distinguishable.
In Edwards, the defendant expressly invoked his right to counsel after having been
informed of his Miranda rights. 451 U.S. at 479. Nevertheless, the police continued to inter-
rogate him in the absence of counsel. Id. The Court held that, once an accused has invoked
his right to counsel, the police may not initiate further interrogation until counsel has been
provided. Id. at 484. The Court observed that in Mosley it had "noted that Miranda had
distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and
a request for an attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was
present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel." Id. at 485.
In contrast to Edwards, the defendant in Pettingill never invoked his right to counsel.
Rather, on two occasions he merely expressed his desire to remain silent. 21 Cal. 3d at 235-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
of relying on the California Constitution to exclude evidence admissi-
ble under the United States Constitution.5 1 Critics have argued that
when the United States Supreme Court has interpreted a provision of
the United States Constitution, the California Supreme Court should
not give a contrary interpretation to the corresponding provision in the
California Constitution "unless conditions peculiar to California sup-
port a different meaning." 52 The California Supreme Court has failed
to suggest any such justification for its different constitutional interpre-
tation; instead, it simply has disagreed with the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court.53 For example, in People v. Brisendine54 the
court stated that in United States v. Robinson,55 the United States
Supreme Court had misinterpreted the fourth amendment:
[W]e cannot accept the Robinson implication that "an individual
lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth
36, 578 P.2d at 110-11, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64. Edwards, therefore, cannot be viewed as
supporting the result in Pettingill.
51. The California Supreme Court, however, is not the only California court to have
excluded evidence on independent state constitutional grounds. The California Court of
Appeal also has done so. For example, in Jennings v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 50,
56-58, 163 Cal. Rptr. 391, 394-96 (1980), the court of appeal rejected the reasoning used by
the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). In DeFil-
4:ppo, the Court held that when a police officer makes an arrest while reasonably relying in
good faith on a presumptively valid ordinance which later is judicially determined to be
unconstitutional, the arrest is valid. Id. at 37-38. In Jennings, the California court held that
such an arrest is unlawful under the California Constitution and that evidence seized as a
result thereof must be excluded. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
52. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 942, 538 P.2d 237, 246, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118
(1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
53. Justice Richardson has sharply criticized the court for repudiating decisions of the
United States Supreme Court because they failed to meet with the approval of a majority of
the California justices. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 120-21, 545 P.2d at 284-85, 127
Cal. Rptr. at 372-73 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting). "The majority's approach makes
transparently clear that the vigor with which the newly discovered separate and independent
state constitutional interpretations are asserted ebbs and flows depending upon the approval
or rejection by the majority of the peculiar constitutional interpretation which, in a given
case, emanates from the federal Supreme Court. This accordion-like effect, this divergence
and convergence, though in a sense predictable with the shifting winds ofjudicial policy and
personal predilection, is not calculated to produce that kind of uniformity or harmony con-
ducive to the logical and uniform development of constitutional law. As a device of consti-
tutional interpretation the majority approach is dubious and suspect. As an instrument of
judicial policy it is illogical and unnecessary." In his dissenting opinion in People v. Nor-
man, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 941-42, 538 P.2d 237, 246-47, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118-19 (1975), Justice
Clark made a similar point by quoting with approval from Justice Thompson's majority
opinion for the court of appeal in Norman. "'[S]omething more than personal disagreement
by a majority of members of a state court with the decision of the United States high tribu-
nal on search and seizure is required if the persuasion of that court is not to be followed."'
54. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
55. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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Amendment interest in the privacy of his person." . . .Whatever
may be the merits of that view when an individual is ultimately to be
booked and incarcerated-a question not presented here-we find it
inappropriate in the context of an arrestee who will never be sub-
jected to that process.
56
The California court also has disagreed with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of its own prior decisions on federal
questions. In People v. Disbrow,5 7 the California Supreme Court stated
that Harris v. New York 58 was inconsistent with the policies underlying
the Miranda v. Arizona59 rules protecting the federal privilege against
self-incrimination. 60 The Disbrow court also questioned the Harris
Court's reliance on its decision in Walder v. United States,6 ' observing
that Walder did not support the Harris rationale.
62
People v. Pettingil63 is another example of the California Supreme
Court's disagreement with the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Miranda decision. By relying on People v. Fioritto and
its California progeny, 65 the Pettingill court justified its refusal to fol-
low Michigan v. Mosley. 66 Yet, as Justice Clark pointed out in dissent,
Fioritto could not be relied upon in interpreting the California Consti-
tution because "it was based on this court's understanding of the princi-
ples announced in Miranda . . . , a United States Supreme Court
decision interpreting the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. ' 67 Justice Clark concluded that "[t]o say that '[r]espect for our
Constitution as "a document of independent force"' forbids us to de-
part from Fioritto when our Constitution in fact had no part in that
decision is less than honest."' 68 By relying on Fioritto, therefore, the
56. 13 Cal. 3d at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237).
57. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
58. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. 16 Cal. 3d at 111-12, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
61. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
62. 16 Cal. 3d at 106-11, 545 P.2d at 274-78, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 362-66.
63. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
64. 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
65. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 238, 578 P.2d 108, 113, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 865
(1978).
66. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
67. 21 Cal. 3d at 252-53, 578 P.2d at 121, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (Clark, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 253, 578 P.2d at 121, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75 (Clark, J., dissenting). Com-
pare Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978), Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), and Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099,
119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975), with People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972). In Anderson, the California Supreme Court concluded that the "cruel or
unusual punishment" clause of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (formerly art. I, § 6), had a meaning
[Vol. 32
Pettingill court in effect adopted an interpretation of Miranda that had
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Mosley.
The court's failure to develop guidelines as to when it is appropri-
ate to invoke independent state constitutional grounds reinforces the
view that the use of such grounds reflects merely the individual philos-
ophies of the justices. In People v. Longwill,69 the prosecution unsuc-
cessfully argued that the court should clearly delineate the criteria that
govern the question of when article I, section 13 of the California Con-
stitution can serve as an independent state ground for adoption of a
more stringent standard than that announced by the United States
Supreme Court.7
0
In attempting to justify its interpretation of the California Consti-
different from the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See
6 Cal. 3d at 634-37, 493 P.2d at 883-86, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155-58. Based on its review of the
history of the California provision, the court concluded that the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1849 had used the disjunctive "or" "in order to establish their intent
that both cruel punishments and unusual punishments be outlawed in this state." Id. at 636-
37, 493 P.2d at 885, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (footnotes omitted). In contrast to Anderson, in
Pettingil, Disbrow, and Brisendine, the California Supreme Court did not show through
historical analysis that CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 13 and 15 were intended to have a meaning
different from that of their almost identical counterparts in the United States Constitution.
69. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975).
70. Id. at 951 n.4, 538 P.2d at 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302 n.4. One commentator
criticized the court's refusal to supply any guidance. "The court failed to look beyond the
prosecution's impertinence to the less obvious plea for guidance as to the nature of the
higher standard for searches and seizures in California. The court has offered no such ex-
planation since Longwill, and parties on either side of a search and seizure case can only
guess the exact contours of the law." Note, The New Federalism: Towarda Princ#p/ed Inter-
pretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 314 n. 119 (1977).
In People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 640 P.2d 753, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982), how-
ever, the court offered some guidance as to when it is inappropriate to interpret the state
constitution as setting a higher standard than the United States Constitution. In Teresinski
the court adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463 (1980), as defining rights under the California Constitution. 30 Cal. 3d at 827, 640
P.2d at 755, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 619. In Crews, the Court permitted the admission of a robbery
victim's trial testimony identifying the defendant even though the victim's pretrial identifica-
tions were the product of an illegal arrest. The Court reasoned that the victim's courtroom
identification "rested on an independent recollection of her initial encounter with the assail-
ant, uninfluenced by the pretrial identifications." Id. at 473. In concluding that no reasons
justified rejecting Crews, the Teresinski court observed that (1) nothing in the language or
history of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution suggests that the issues should
be resolved differently than in Crews; (2) in Crews the Court did not overrule past precedent
or limit previously established rights under the federal constitution; (3) Crews was a unani-
mous decision and has not inspired extensive criticism; (4) Crews is consistent with past
California precedent. 30 Cal. 3d at 836-837, 640 P.2d at 648, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 625. Al-
though Teresinski indicates that the presence of all four factors means that the independent
state grounds doctrine should not be invoked, it provides no guidance as to what the result
should be when one or more of these factors are missing.
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tution as affording greater protection than the United States Constitu-
tion, the court sometimes has used a reasoning process that would be
questionable even absent a contradictory United States Supreme Court
decision. People v. Disbrow71 is an example of such questionable rea-
soning. In barring the prosecution from using statements obtained in
violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, the Disbrow court re-
lied in part on the need to preserve judicial integrity.7 2 The court was
concerned that the admission of the "illegally extracted" statements
would impair judicial integrity because the courts thereby would be
lending their aid to "'the success of the lawless venture.' ",73 The exclu-
sion of the statements, on the other hand, would "'relieve the courts
from being compelled to participate in such illegal conduct.' ,,74
The Disbrow court's reasoning may be questioned on two bases.
First, the result in Disbrow demeans judicial integrity and thus is incon-
sistent with the court's own reasoning. By removing the risk of im-
peachment, Disbrow protects the perjurer and therefore indirectly
encourages perjury. It is more detrimental to judicial integrity for the
court to participate, albeit indirectly, in the commission of perjury than
in the violation of a technical rule such as that prescribed by
Miranda .5
Second, the Disbrow court's reliance on judicial integrity is incon-
sistent with its decision in People v. Varnum 76 that noncoercive interro-
gation in violation of Miranda is not in itself unlawful.77 Under
Varnum, a court does not lend its aid to a "lawless venture" by permit-
ting a defendant to be impeached by prior statements obtained as a
result of such interrogation, because such statements have not been un-
lawfully extracted.
Finally, the California Supreme Court's different interpretation of
the state constitution has been criticized, because it adds complexity to
an already complex body of law relating to the legality of police con-
71. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
72. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 279-80, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
73. Id., 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955)).
74. Id., 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (quoting Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 CaL
3d 150, 156, 491 P.2d 1, 4, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1971)).
75. In reaching a contrary result in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court concluded that "[tihe shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confronta-
tion with prior inconsistent utterances."
76. 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967).
77. Id. at 812-13, 427 P.2d at 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12. See the discussion of
Varnum note 1 supra.
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duct.78 Instead of a single, uniform, federal standard by which to judge
the legality of such conduct, decisions based on the California Consti-
tution and decisions based on the United States Constitution present
police with competing and inconsistent standards of behavior. These
two tiers of constitutional interpretations can only complicate the po-
lice officer's task of understanding what the law requires. 79
Exclusion Based on Nonconstitutional Grounds When the Evidence Is
Admissible Under Federal Law
In some decisions, the California Supreme Court has relied on
nonstatutory independent state grounds other than the state constitu-
tion to formulate rules excluding evidence admissible under federal
law. The vicarious exclusionary rule, adopted in People v. Martin0
and reaffirmed in Kaplan v. Superior Court,8' is the most noteworthy of
these rules.82 It permits a defendant to object to the introduction of
evidence illegally seized from a third person, although the search did
not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. 83 Under federal law, a
defendant lacks standing to object to the admission of evidence ob-
tained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure unless it violated his
or her own fourth amendment rights.84 As a general rule, a search or
seizure violates the defendant's fourth amendment rights only if he or
she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.5 .
When the California Supreme Court has invoked nonstatutory in-
dependent state grounds other than the California Constitution to ex-
78. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 119, 545 P.2d at 283-84, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 371-
72 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
79. See note 121 infra.
80. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
81. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
82. Eight months before Martin, the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusion-
ary rule as "a judicially declared rule of evidence." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442,
282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955). Martin's vicarious application of the exclusionary rule was merely
an extension of this judicially declared rule. The Martin court did not intimate that such a
vicarious application was constitutionally compelled. See 45 Cal. 2d at 759-61, 290 P.2d at
856-57. In Kaplan, the defendant contended that the vicarious exclusionary rule was re-
quired by the state constitution, but the court refused to address this issue. 6 Cal. 3d at 161
n.9, 491 P.2d at 8 n.9, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.9.
83. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d at 157, 491 P.2d at 4-5, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 652;
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
84. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-74 (1968).
85. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143. Only one other state, Louisiana, has adopted the
vicarious exclusionary rule. See State v. Roach, 338 So. 2d 621 (La. 1976). The other states
have adhered to the federal rule of standing. See 3 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3(j), at 608-09 (1978).
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clude evidence admissible under federal law, it has done so not because
of conditions peculiar to California, but because of the individual pref-
erences of the majority. In Kaplan, Justice Burke criticized the major-
ity for relying on their own preferences to retain the vicarious
exclusionary rule.
It is clear. . . that the majority reaffirm Martin solely upon the basis
of their own preferences regarding the scope of the exclusionary rule,
and have abandoned further reliance upon federal constitutional
principles, as defined by the United States Supreme Court. In view
of the apparent need for uniform standards in the search and seizure
area, I deem such a course improvident.
86
Moreover, the majority's rationale in Kaplan for rejecting the fed-
eral rule was unconvincing. As in People v. Disbrow,8 7 the court relied
in part on the need to preserve judicial integrity.88 Yet, the vicarious
exclusionary rule approved in Kaplan actually permits the defendant to
assert the constitutional rights of his or her victim.8 9 Judicial integrity
is undermined when a defendant commits a crime against another, dis-
regarding the victim's constitutional rights, 90 and the courts then allow
the defendant to rely on those same rights to invoke the exclusionary
86. 6 Cal. 3d at 162, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (Burke, J., concurring).
87. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
88. 6 Cal. 3d at 155-57, 491 P.2d at 3-5, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
89. See People v. Hackett, 115 Cal. App. 3d 592, 595, 171 Cal. Rptr. 320, 321 (1981)
(car thief had standing to challenge the search of the car he was charged with stealing). In
addition, as one commentator noted, Kaplan itself arguably may be viewed as a case in
which the defendant was permitted to rely on the privacy rights of his victim. "The defend-
ant was charged with selling drugs to a minor. In analogous circumstances, the minor has
been held to be a 'victim' and not an accomplice in the transaction. Thus, in a charge of
lewd conduct with a minor, though the minor consents, he is not an accomplice, but the
victim. It is clear that the purchaser of drugs is not the seller's accomplice. Thus, arguably,
the minor purchaser in a drug sales case is the victim. The defendant in Kaplan relied on the
privacy rights of the minor purchaser to suppress the evidence." Simons, California's Rule of
Vicarious Exclusion: Who May Challenge the Constable's Errors?, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
319, 349 n.131 (1979) (citations omitted).
In People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 566 P.2d 627, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1977), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a burglar could not rely on the vicarious exclusionary rule to
claim that a police officer had violated the victim's right to privacy by entering the victim's
residence to arrest the burglar without complying with the knock and notice requirements of
CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970). Id. at 764, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The
court observed that the rule applies only to "evidence illegally seized from a third person,"
and the evidence introduced against the burglar was not illegally seized. Id. The court
expressed the opinion that by entering the residence the police officer had protected the
victim's rights, not violated them. Id. Solario thus implies that if the police officer had
violated the victim's right to privacy, the vicarious exclusionary rule would have permitted
the burglar to rely on that violation as a basis for excluding evidence.
90. Under CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1, all people have the "inalienable rights" of "enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing




Without relying on the state constitution, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Jimenez92 created another rule requiring the exclu-
sion of evidence admissible under federal law. The court held that
before a defendant's confession may be admitted, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.
93
The court adopted this standard of proof as "a judicially declared rule
of criminal procedure." 94 Under federal law, on the other hand, the
standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.95
The court's reasoning in People v. Jimenez96 is questionable. In
Lego v. Twomey 97 the United States Supreme Court observed that
"from our experience . . . no substantial evidence has accumulated
91. In light of the fact that the exclusionary rule has diminished the public's perception
of judicial integrity, it is questionable whether the judicial integrity rationale can serve as a
valid basis for excluding evidence. See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1035-37 (1974); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid
Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215, 223 (1978).
The validity of the rationale is undermined also by its inconsistency with the rule that
"[ilt is no defense to a state or federal criminal prosecution that a defendant was illegally
arrested or forcibly brought within the jurisdiction of the court." People v. Bradford, 70 Cal.
2d 333, 344, 450 P.2d 46, 52, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 732 (1969). It is illogical to rely on judicial
integrity as one of the reasons for excluding illegally seized evidence while permitting the
prosecution of a defendant whose presence before the court is due solely to an illegal seizure
of his person. See Wilkey, supra, at 223-25.
The validity of the rationale is further eroded by the courts' refusal to apply the exclu-
sionary rule to illegal searches and seizures by private citizens acting alone. See People v.
North, 29 Cal. 3d 509, 629 P.2d 19, 174 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1981). If judicial integrity were an
important consideration, it would seem to follow that the rationale should require the exclu-
sion of evidence unlawfully seized by private citizens. Otherwise, the courts might be
deemed to have lent their assistance to such "lawless ventures." Even the California
Supreme Court has recognized that judicial integrity "might to some extent be served by
excluding evidence derived from an unlawful search by a private citizen. . . ." Dyas v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 632, 522 P.2d 674, 675-77, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116-17 (1974).
92. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
93. Id. at 608, 580 P.2d at 679, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
94. Id. at 605, 580 P.2d at 677, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
95. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1971). The court in Jimenez applied its
decision retroactively to cases then pending on appeal. 21 Cal. 3d at 608, 580 P.2d at 679,
147 Cal. Rptr. at 179. In In re Anthony J., 86 Cal. App. 3d 164, 150 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1978),
this retroactive application led to the reversal of the juvenile court's judgment that the minor
had committed two counts of first degree murder, nine counts of first degree robbery, one
count of second degree robbery, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 166,
172, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 184, 188. The minor had confessed to these crimes, and the appellate
court reasoned that the juvenile court "cannot be presumed to have applied the retroactively
required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard." Id. at 172, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis
in original).
96. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
97. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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that federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility [of a
confession] by a preponderance of the evidence."98 It went on to say
that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard undermines "the public
interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of
arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence." 99
Exclusion in Reliance on Both the California and United States
Constitutions
The California Supreme Court occasionally has relied on both the
federal and state constitutions to exclude evidence. Unlike the cases
previously discussed, in these cases there was no contrary decision by
the United States Supreme Court permitting the admission of the evi-
dence.' 00 Thus, the California Supreme Court was able to interpret
both constitutions as requiring exclusion.
The court's reliance on both constitutions has insulated its deci-
sions from review by the United States Supreme Court. That Court
will not review a state court judgment based upon adequate and in-
dependent state grounds, even if the issue also involves a federal ques-
tion. 10 1 Thus, by invoking both federal and state grounds, the
California Supreme Court in effect has restricted the United States
98. Id. at 488.
99. Id. at 489.
100. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973);
People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Bielicki v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962); see also People v.
Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 605 P.2d 843, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980). In Rucker, the court held
that both the state and federal privilege against self-incrimination prohibited admission of a
defendant's responses to questions asked in a legitimate booking interview unless the ac-
cused had waived his or her Miranda rights. Id. at 373, 386, 389, 605 P.2d at 845, 853, 855,
162 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 23, 25. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise
issue in Rucker. It would appear, however, that the Rucker holding is inconsistent with the
rationale of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), which was decided afterRucker. In
Innis, the Court concluded that Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation, and that
"the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse." 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis in original).
A legitimate booking interview is not reasonably likely to elicit such a response. The
purpose of a legitimate booking interview is to elicit background information concerning the
accused. This information generally has no connection with the circumstances of the crime
with which he or she has been charged. "The limited information needed at a booking
procedure is required solely for the purposes of internal jail administration, not for use in
connection with any criminal proceeding against the arrestee." People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d
at 387, 605 P.2d at 854, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. The rationale of Innis, therefore, would
seem to indicate that a Miranda waiver is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of the de-
fendant's responses during such an interview.
101. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
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Supreme Court's role as the ultimate arbiter of federal law. 102 Even if
the California court's interpretation of that law is erroneous, the United
States Supreme Court will not review the decision because it also is
based on the California Constitution. Although the California inter-
pretation of federal law would not be binding on other jurisdictions,
they might view the California interpretation as persuasive
authority.10 3
People v. Krivda14 exemplifies the California Supreme Court's re-
liance on both the federal and state constitutions to insulate its decision
from review by the United States Supreme Court. In ZKrivda, the court
held that the police could not lawfully conduct a warrantless search of
a trash barrel placed adjacent to the street for pickup by the rubbish
collector.10 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.1
0 6
After briefing and argument, the Court vacated the judgment and re-
manded the cause to the California Supreme Court without determin-
ing the merits of the fourth amendment issue.'0 7 The Court explained
that it was unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court
had relied on the fourth amendment, or the equivalent provision of the
California Constitution, or both.
0 8
On remand, the California Supreme Court reiterated the earlier
Krivda opinion in its entirety, and certified that it had "relied upon
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and ar-
102. According to Professor Bice, relying on both state and federal grounds also pre-
cludes effective political review of the state court's ruling. He reasons that such dual reliance
discourages the legislature and the public from seeking to amend the state constitution to
overturn the court's interpretation of that constitution, because such an amendment cannot
affect the court's interpretation of federal law and therefore will not change the result of the
court's decision. Bice, Anderson And The Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 750,
757 (1972).
103. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Linde, a strong proponent of states' rights who be-
lieves that a claim of deprivation of due process or equal protection always should be ad-
dressed first under the state constitution, has taken the position that if the court finds such a
deprivation under the state constitution, it should not even address the question whether a
similar deprivation exists under the United States Constitution. Linde, Without "Due Pro-
cess" UnconsitutionaiLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 133-35 (1970). Justice Linde has
criticized the California Supreme Court for relying on both state and federal constitutional
guarantees to reach the same result. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. Rv. 325, 336-37
(1973).
104. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409
U.S. 33 (1972), on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412
U.S. 919 (1973).
105. 5 Cal. 3d at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
106. 405 U.S. 1039 (1972).
107. 409 U.S. 33, 35 (1972).
108. Id.
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ticle I, section 19, of the California Constitution, and that accordingly
the latter provision furnished an independent ground to support the
result we reached in that opinion."' 0 9 The prosecution's subsequent
petition for a writ of certiorari was denied,110 apparently because the
California Supreme Court had relied on an independent state
ground. I
Exclusion Without Determining Admissibility Under the Federal
Constitution
In some cases, when no United States Supreme Court ruling has
been made on the issue, the California Supreme Court has relied solely
on the California Constitution to exclude evidence without determining
its admissibility under the United States Constitution. For example, in
People v. Zelinski,i12 the court held that article I, section 13 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution mandated the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
seized by private security guards.' 
3
Again relying on article I, section 13, in Burrows v. Superior
109. 8 Cal. 3d at 624, 504 P.2d at 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 521. Article I, § 19 is now article
i, § 13.
110. 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
111. Krivda should be contrasted with People v. Braeseke, 25 Cal. 3d 691, 602 P.2d 384,
159 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979), in which the California Supreme Court held inadmissible a mur-
der suspect's confession. As in Kritda, the United States Supreme Court remanded the cause
to the California Supreme Court to determine whether the latter court had relied on federal
or state constitutional grounds, or both. 446 U.S. 932 (1980). Unlike Krivda, on remand the
California Supreme Court indicated that its opinion in Braeseke was based solely on federal
law. 28 Cal. 3d 86, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980). The United States Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari. 451 U.S. 1021 (1981).
Furthermore, in People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 591 P.2d 514, 521-22, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 224, 231-32 (1979), the court excluded evidence solely in reliance on the fourth amend-
ment. The court stated that its opinion "intimates no views on how the validity of the search
in this case would be decided under the California Constitution." Id. at 424 n.8, 591 P.2d at
521 n.8, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 232 n.8. Thus, in Minjares, the court allowed review of its decision
by the United States Supreme Court. The Court, however, denied certiorari. 444 U.S. 887
(1979).
It is unclear why in Krivda the court relied on both the California and United States
Constitutions, thereby foreclosing review, while in Braeseke and Minjares it relied solely on
federal law, thereby permitting review. This lack of clarity demonstrates the need for guide-
lines in this area.
112. 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979).
113. Id. at 368, 594 P.2d at 1006-07, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82. United States v. Fran-
coeur, 547 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977), is contrary to Zelinski. As Francoeur is the decision of a
lower federal court, its interpretation of federal law is not binding on California courts. See
People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969). Thus, if
the court in Zelinski had decided to rely only on federal law, it would have had the power to
interpret that law differently from Francoeur.
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Court"14 the court held that without the benefit of legal process or the
consent of a bank customer, the police could not lawfully obtain copies
of the customer's bank statements from the bank.1 5 When the court
rendered its decision, the United States Supreme Court had not de-
cided this issue. Later, in United States v. Miller," 6 the United States
Supreme Court reached a contrary result." 
7
The California Supreme Court should not exclude evidence in re-
liance solely on the state constitution without first determining its ad-
missibility under the United States Constitution. If the court
determines that the United States Constitution mandates the exclusion
of the evidence, there is no need for the court to ascertain whether the
state constitution requires the same result. Because of the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution, l" 8 the court must order the
exclusion of the evidence regardless of whether it is admissible under
the state constitution.' '9 In order to give the United States Supreme
Court the opportunity to review the California court's interpretation of
114. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
115. Id. at 245, 529 P.2d at 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
116. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1975).
117. The California Right to Financial Privacy Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493
(West 1980), has codified Burrows. The Act mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of its provisions. Id. § 7489. Senate Bill 1092, which accompanies SCA 7, see note
8 supra, also provides for the exclusion of such evidence. Because SCA 7 would not alter
exclusion required by statute, SCA 7 would not undermine the confidentiality of bank
records. The Financial Privacy Act does not encompass protection for the confidentiality of
credit card records, which currently are protected under People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 650-
53, 602 P.2d 738, 744-46, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 824-26 (1979). Senate Bill 1092, however,
would amend the Act to include credit card records, so that their confidentiality would be
preserved.
118. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; f CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 1 ("The State of California is an
inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.").
119. Former Chief Justice Wright made a similar point in his concurring opinion in
Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971). In Jolicoeur, the
court held that both the twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and Cali-
fornia law required that minors of voting age be treated like adults for purposes of acquiring
a voting residence. Id. at 582, 488 P.2d at 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 708. The Chief Justice found
that, because the court's holding was compelled by the twenty-sixth amendment, it was un-
necessary to reach the issue of whether California law required the same result. "As the
Twenty-sixth Amendment expressly prohibits the described state conduct, we need not in-
quire further and to do so only emphasizes matters which should be of no concern to us.
"There is no stronger statement of governing policy considerations in any particular
circumstance than an express declaration embodied in our federal Constitution. Where, as
here, such a declaration is manifestly dispositive of the single issue no good purpose is
served by a concurrent examination of state or federal policies, or legislative histories, in an
attempt to ascertain that the supreme law of the land must be adhered to because lesser
policy considerations likewise require the same result." Id. at 583, 488 P.2d at 12, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 708 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
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federal law, the California court should not address the issue of admis-
sibility under state law. Only if the court decides that the evidence is
admissible under the United States Constitution should the court deter-
mine whether it might be excluded under the California Constitu-
tion.120 Such exclusion can be justified only if conditions peculiar to
California warrant a different interpretation of the relevant state consti-
tutional provision.
SCA 7: A Bar to Nonstatutory Independent State Grounds
The Scope of SCA 7
SCA 7 would overrule California decisions to the extent that they
have excluded evidence on nonstatutory independent state grounds and
would prevent California courts from excluding evidence on such
grounds in the future. If SCA 7 is adopted, evidence could be excluded
only as required by the United States Constitution or pursuant to a
statute enacted by the state legislature.
12'
120. If the court decided that the evidence was admissible under the United States Con-
stitution but inadmissible under the state constitution, its interpretation of federal law also
would be insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court. This insulation would
rarely occur, however, because it is doubtful that there would be many situations in which
conditions peculiar to California would justify a different interpretation of the state constitu-
tion.
The insulation would be unavoidable. If the state constitution mandates the exclusion
of evidence admissible under the United States Constitution, the court must so state and
explain the reason for the different interpretations of the two constitutions. On the other
hand, when the court determines that the United States Constitution mandates the exclusion
of evidence, there is no need for the court to hold that the state constitution compels the
same result, thereby insulating its interpretation of federal law from further review.
121. See note 8 supra. Although SCA 7 would prevent the California Supreme Court
from relying on the state constitution to exclude evidence admissible under federal law, it
would not prevent the court from relying on that constitution to declare police conduct un-
lawful when the same conduct was lawful under the United States Constitution. Thus,
under SCA 7, a search, seizure, or interrogation might be found unlawful under the state
constitution, even though exclusion would be unavailable as a remedy because the police
conduct was lawful under the United States Constitution.
The limited scope of SCA 7 would result in conflicting federal and state standards of
police conduct, only one of which, the federal standard, would be enforceable through the
exclusionary rule. Yet, because police officers are bound to uphold both constitutions, they
would be required to conform their conduct to the more stringent state standard.
The California Supreme Court's decisions setting a higher standard under the state con-
stitution hinder the investigation of criminal activity and are of questionable validity. See
notes 52-79 & accompanying text supra. It may be appropriate, therefore, to amend SCA 7
to provide that police conduct shall be unlawful only if it violates the United States Consti-
tution or a state statute. Such an amendment would preclude the California Supreme Court
from using the state constitution to invalidate police conduct that was lawful under the
United States Constitution. The amendment would have the salutary effect of clarifying the
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The passage of SCA 7 does not mean that all evidence previously
excluded on nonstatutory independent state grounds would become ad-
missible. Evidence still would be excluded when required by a Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision relying on both the federal and state
constitutions, so long as there had been no decision to the contrary by
the United States Supreme Court. The state grounds no longer would
be a legitimate basis for excluding evidence, but the federal grounds
would continue to provide a legitimate basis. Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law would be binding on lower California courts. 122 Even if there were
lower federal court decisions to the contrary, the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law would prevail in the state court
system. California courts are not bound by the decisions of lower fed-
eral courts on federal questions. 123 If, however, such contrary lower
federal court decisions were rendered after the most recent decision of
the California Supreme Court excluding evidence, one could argue that
the state court should reexamine its interpretation of federal law. If the
California Supreme Court adhered to its former decision, the prosecu-
tion could seek review in the United States Supreme Court.124 Under
SCA-7, the California courts no longer could rely on independent state
constitutional grounds and thereby insulate their decisions from such
review.125
law relating to the legality of police conduct. Instead of two inconsistent constitutional stan-
dards, there would be a single federal standard. By simplifying the law and making it more
comprehensible, the amendment would enhance the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
The rule can deter a police officer only when he or she understands that his or her conduct is
unlawful.
122. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937,
939, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1962).
123. People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
125. The United States Supreme Court, of course, would have discretion whether or not
to review the decisions. See id In contrast, when the California Supreme Court currently
relies on both federal and state grounds in excluding evidence, the federal high court has no
discretion to exercise. In these cases, review is automatically denied. See note 101 & accom-
panying text supra.
It has been alleged, however, that "[i]f the Supreme Court of California were to use
California constitutional bases not found in the United States Constitution, the [United
States Supreme] [Court would still apply its independent state grounds rule notwithstanding
the adoption of SCA 7." J.J. Cleary, The Double Standard: Does the Law Apply to Law
Enforcement? 13 (Mar. 10, 1981) (unpublished paper presented to the California Senate
Judiciary Committee) [hereinafter cited as Cleary]. Under SCA 7 the federal constitutional
standard would be controlling; therefore, it is questionable whether in these circumstances
the independent state grounds rule would serve as a valid basis for denying review. More-
over, if SCA 7 were passed, it is unlikely that a majority of the justices on the California
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In situations in which the United States Supreme Court had ren-
dered no decision on point, and the California Supreme Court had re-
lied exclusively on the California Constitution to exclude evidence,
126
under SCA 7 the California Supreme Court would have to determine
whether exclusion was mandated by the United States Constitution. If
it concluded that the Constitution did not require exclusion, the evi-
dence would be admissible. 127 If, on the other hand, the court con-
cluded that exclusion was required as a matter of federal law, the
prosecution would be able to seek review of its decision in the United
States Supreme Court.
Two Examples of SCA 7's Limits
Exclusion as a Sanction for the Failure of Law Enforcement Officials to
Preserve Material Evidence
In People v. Hitch,128 the California Supreme Court authorized the
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence as a sanction for the failure of
law enforcement officials to preserve other evidence material to the de-
fense. In Hitch, the defendant, charged with drunk driving, had taken
a chemical test of his breath on a breathalyzer. As investigative offi-
cials had intentionally but nonmaliciously destroyed the test ampoule,
its contents, and the reference ampoule used in the test, the state was
unable to disclose these items. The court held that in these circum-
stances sanctions should not be imposed if "the prosecution can show
that the governmental agencies involved have established, enforced
and attempted in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic proce-
dures designed to preserve the test ampoule and its contents and the
reference ampoule used in such chemical test."' 129 The Hitch court con-
cluded that, if the prosecution could not make this showing, due pro-
cess required the suppression of the test results. 130 The rationale of
Hitch has been applied to other situations in which law enforcement
officials have destroyed or lost material evidence.131
Supreme Court would openly violate the state constitution by continuing to exclude evi-
dence on nonstatutory independent state grounds.
126. E.g., People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979).
127. Of course, the legislature might codify the court's earlier decision requiring exclu-
sion, thereby ensuring exclusion despite SCA 7.
128. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
129. Id. at 652-53, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
130. Id. at 653, 527 P.2d at 369-70, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
131. See People v. Alfieri, 95 Cal. App. 3d 533, 546-47, 157 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312-13 (1979)
(destruction of tape recordings of telephone conversations); People v. Swearingen, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 570, 574-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 755, 756-57 (1978) (loss of vial that contained
marijuana).
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SCA 7 is not likely to undermine Hitch. The proposed amend-
ment provides for the exclusion of evidence when required by the
United States Constitution. The Hitch court held that under certain
conditions due process requires the exclusion of evidence, but failed to
indicate whether it was relying on the due process clause of the state'
32
or of the United States Constitution. 133 As the court usually is explicit
in relying on state grounds, 1 34 it appears that the court was not relying
solely on the California Constitution. Furthermore, in Hitch the court
cited federal cases in support of its holding. 135 If Hitch had been based
solely on the California Constitution, it would have been unnecessary
and immaterial to rely on the federal cases.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided the issue
presented in Hitch. Thus, there is no higher authority contrary to
Hitch's apparent interpretation of the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. Accordingly, if SCA 7 is passed, Hitch should re-
tain its precedential value. Of course, if the United States Supreme
Court determines at some point that the United States Constitution
does not require the result in Hitch, then the decision no longer would
be authority for California courts.
Exclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding a New Scientifrc Technique
Before expert testimony regarding a new scientific technique may
be admitted, the reliability of the technique must be established.136 In
Frye v. United States,'37 a federal appellate court formulated a test for
determining reliability. The court stated that it must be shown that the
technique has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."'138 California courts have expressly adopted the Frye
test. 139
SCA 7 would not deprive the courts of the power to exclude evi-
dence that failed to meet the Frye test. California Evidence Code sec-
tion 801(b) provides in relevant part that an expert's opinion may be
based only on matter "that is of a type that reasonably may be relied
132. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
133. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
134. See People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 368, 594 P.2d 1000, 1006-07, 155 Cal. Rptr.
575, 581-82 (1979).
135. 12 Cal. 3d at 654, 527 P.2d at 370-71, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
136. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976); CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966).
137. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
138. Id. at 1014.
139. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (1976).
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upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such
matter as a basis for his opinion."' 40 The Law Revision Commission
comment to section 801 noted that the section is intended to allow the
courts to set the standards as to what constitutes reliable matter within
the meaning of the statute.'
4'
SCA 7 permits the exclusion of evidence if a statute provides for
its exclusion. As section 801(b) allows the courts to determine what
constitutes reliable matter, SCA 7 would not affect the judicially de-
clared reliability test for new scientific techniques.
Incorporation of a Good Faith Exception Under SCA 7
The United States Supreme Court may create an exception to the
exclusionary rule for situations in which a police officer acts in the rea-
sonable, good faith, but mistaken belief that his or her conduct does not
violate the fourth amendment. A number of its decisions are consistent
with such an exception. 42 In United States v. Williams, 43 the Fifth
Circuit expressly adopted this exception to the exclusionary rule.' 44
The United States Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime
140. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1966).
141. Id. § 801, Law Revision Comment, at 389-91 (West 1966). According to the com-
ment, when § 801(b) provides that an expert may not rely upon matter that he or she is
"precluded by law" from relying upon, the law referred to includes "decisional law of this
State." 1d. at 391. The comment notes that § 801(b) "formulate[s] a general rule that speci-
fies the minimum requisites that must be met in every case, leaving to the courts the task of
determining particular details within this general framework." Id. at 390. Thus, § 801(b)
"provides assurance that the courts and the Legislature are free to continue to develop spe-
cific rules regarding the proper bases for particular kinds of expert opinion in specific fields."
Id. at 391. The comment concludes with the opinion that § 801(b) "continues in effect the
discretionary power of the courts to regulate abuses, thereby retaining in large measure the
existing California law." Id.
The commission's comments "are declarative of the intent not only of the draftsman of
the code but also of the legislators who subsequently enacted it." Kaplan v. Superior Court,
6 Cal. 3d 150, 158 n.4, 491 P.2d 1, 5 n.4, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 n.4 (1971).
142. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), discussed in note 51 supra; see also
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). In Peltier, the Court refused to apply retroac-
tively its decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1975), invalidating
roving border patrol searches for illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that prior to Almeida-
Sanchez both an administrative regulation and the lower federal courts erroneously had
interpreted a federal statute as authorizing such border searches, and the border patrol
agents reasonably and in good faith had relied on their interpretation of the law. In addi-
tion, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), the Court recognized that when a
police officer acts "in complete good faith, .. the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary
rule] loses much of its force."
143. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
144. Id. at 846-47.
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has advocated the adoption of such an exception, 145 recommending
that "[a] showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within
the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a good
faith belief."1
46
It is justifiable not to invoke the exclusionary rule when a police
officer has acted reasonably and in good faith, even if his or her con-
duct violated a defendant's fourth amendment rights. The exclusionary
rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."1 47 As Justice
White recognized in his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell,t48 the
rule cannot have any deterrent effect when a police officer has acted
reasonably and in good faith.
The officers, if they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in simi-
lar circumstances in the future; and the only consequence of the rule
as presently administered is that unimpeachable and probative evi-
dence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding function of
proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted.149
Moreover, the admission of illegally seized evidence would not
tarnish judicial integrity when a police officer has acted reasonably and
in good faith. By permitting the admission of such evidence in these
circumstances, the courts merely would be acknowledging, as the
United States Supreme Court already has recognized, that the admis-
sion of illegally seized evidence cannot impair judicial integrity when
its exclusion would have no deterrent effect.150
145. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT 55 (1981).
146. Id.
147. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
148. 428 U:S. 465 (1976).
149. Id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446
(1974), in which the Court observed that it is unrealistic to expect perfection from a police
officer "Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair
one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no er-
rors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must
consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose."
150. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975), in which the Court con-
cluded that "the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is... not offended if law enforcement
officials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law
even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure had held that conduct of the type en-
gaged in by law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution." (emphasis in
original). Later, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976), the Court equated
'Judicial integrity" with the deterrence of unlawful conduct: "The primary meaning of 'ju-
dicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or
encourage violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area, however, the evi-
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The lack of justification for the exclusionary rule is especially
acute when a magistrate issues a search warrant based on a factually
accurate affidavit, a police officer properly executes the warrant, and
the courts subsequently quash the warrant on the ground that it was
not supported by probable cause. Excluding the evidence seized during
the execution of the search warrant could have no deterrent effect on
law enforcement. The conduct of the police was procedurally faultless.
They took the time and effort to prepare an affidavit and present it to
the magistrate. The mistake was made by the magistrate, not the
police.
As the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not furthered by apply-
ing the rule when the police have acted reasonably and in good faith, it
should not be applied in such circumstances. "Such a continued
wooden application of the rule beyond its proper ambit to situations
that its purposes cannot serve bids fair to destroy the rule entirely in the
long run."'15'
If SCA 7 is not passed and the United States Supreme Court
adopts a general exception to the exclusionary rule for good faith, rea-
sonable conduct, it is uncertain whether the California Supreme Court
also would adopt this exception. 152 The California court would have
the power to reject it by relying on independent state grounds. If, on
the other hand, SCA 7 were passed and the United States Supreme
dence is unquestionably accurate, and the violation is complete by the time the evidence is
presented to the court. The focus therefore must be on the question whether the admission
of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court has noted
in recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion
would serve a deterrent purpose." (Citations omitted). When a police officer acts reason-
ably and in good faith, the exclusionary rule can have no deterrent effect. See notes 148-49
& accompanying text supra.
In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court has
viewed the concept of "judicial integrity" as different from the deterrence of unlawful con-
duct. See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 655, 602 P.2d 738, 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 827
(1979); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 279-80, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367-
68 (1976).
151. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 847 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
152. The court has not favorably viewed the proposed exception. In People v. Teresin-
ski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 831 n.6, 640, P.2d 753, 758 n.6, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617, 622 n.6 (1982), it
expressed the opinion that such an exception would appear barred by Mapp. v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), and subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions. The Mapp court
held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the [United States]
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655. The Ter-
esinski court, however, expressly declined to decide "whether under exceptional circum-
stances an officer's reasonable mistake of law might validate police conduct. 30 Cal.
3d at 831-32, 640 P.2d at 758, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
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Court adopted such an exception, it automatically would become the
law in California unless the legislature came to a contrary decision.
The California Supreme Court would lack the power to rely on non-
statutory independent state grounds to reject the exception.
Criticisms of SCA 7
No Factual Survey Has Demonstrated the Necessity of SCA 7
One critic of SCA 7 has taken the position that, before the legisla-
ture recommends SCA 7 to the electorate, it "should obtain empirical
data both as to the quantity and quality of the grant of suppression
motions in California criminal cases."1 53 This commentator has urged
that a "factual survey" be conducted to obtain this information. 54 The
implication is that such a survey might show that SCA 7 is unnecessary
and therefore should not be enacted.
It would not be practical for the legislature to delay further action
on SCA 7 until such a survey could be completed. To be relevant to
SCA 7, the survey would have to specify how often California courts
relied on nonstatutory independent state grounds to exclude evidence
admissible under federal law. It would be difficult to arrive at this
figure with any degree of accuracy. When a trial court grants a motion
to suppress evidence, it usually does not indicate whether it is relying
on the United States Constitution, the state constitution, or a judicially
declared rule of evidence or criminal procedure. Moreover, even if the
trial court expressly stated that it was excluding evidence in reliance
solely on independent state grounds, it might be unclear whether the
evidence would be admissible under federal law.
Furthermore, to avoid being misleading, the survey would have to
indicate how many cases were not filed because the prosecution deter-
mined that evidence admissible under the United States Constitution
would be inadmissible on nonstatutory independent state grounds.
Like a judge who grants a motion to suppress, a prosecutor who refuses
to fie a case because of inadmissible evidence usually does not state
under which constitution the evidence was deemed inadmissible. Thus,
it also would be difficult to take this factor into account.
Moreover, if after a case had been filed the prosecutor believed
that the defendant's motion to suppress evidence was meritorious, the
prosecutor might agree to a case settlement that he or she otherwise
would refuse. It would not be feasible for a survey to take into account
153. Cleary, supra note 125, at 1.
154. Id.
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the extent to which such case settlements were precipitated by motions
to suppress based on nonstatutory independent state grounds.
Because of these problems, any survey would be inconclusive and
only would serve the purpose of further delaying necessary reform of
the exclusionary rule.
SCA 7 Is Contrary to Federalism
SCA 7 has been criticized as contrary to the concept of federalism
because it subverts "[tihe integrity of California as a sovereign in deter-
mining its own law."' 155 Sovereignty belongs to the people of the state,
however, not to the judiciary.1 56 By adopting SCA 7, the people of
California would follow the tradition of amending the constitution to
prevent a government institution, the California Supreme Court, from
acting contrary to the will of the people.
157
Rather than subverting the sovereignty of the state, SCA 7 permits
the true sovereign, the people, to express their will regarding what the
law should be. Moreover, SCA 7 permits the state legislature, which
represents the people, to exclude evidence admissible under federal
law.
Under SCA 7, the Legislature Would Supplant the Role of the Courts
SCA 7 has also been characterized as "a radical attack by the legis-
lative branch on the legal system-asserting legislative power in such a
way to entirely supplant the role of the courts."' 58 To the contrary,
under SCA 7 the California courts would retain their vital role of inter-
preting the United States Constitution. Absent a United States
Supreme Court decision to the contrary, the California interpretation
would stand. 159 The legislature lacks the power to interfere with this
role. In addition, SCA 7 would not impair the court's ability to inter-
155. Id. at 10; see also SCA 7 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 2.
156. See Colorado State Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 442, 448 P.2d
624, 628 (1968): "An amendment to the constitution is the solemn final exercise of the sover-
eignty which belongs to the People of the State of Colorado. Neither executive order, nor
legislative enactment, nor judicial decision can be permitted to render futile this expressed
will of the People."
157. "[W]here there is public dissatisfaction and/or disenchantment with the function-
ing or responsiveness of governmental institutions, to the social needs and desires of the
electorate, power unquestionably has been reserved in the people or the electorate to alter
the form and substance of the social compact by constitutional amendment." Fritz v. Gor-
ton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 280, 517 P.2d 911, 915 (1974).
158. Barnhart, SCA 7- A R§flection of Our Times, L.A. Daily J., May 26, 1981, at 4, col.
6.
159. See note 123 & accompanying text supra.
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pret the state constitution: it would only preclude the use of the exclu-
sionary rule as a remedy for violations of that constitution.'
60
SCA 7 Repudiates All California Decisions Based on Nonstatutory
Independent State Grounds
It has been suggested that, instead of adopting the SCA 7 ap-
proach of repudiating all California decisions relying on nonstatutory
independent state grounds to exclude evidence, it would be a better
policy to give the voters the opportunity to decide which decisions were
deserving of repudiation. 16' The implementation of such a policy
would not be feasible. Instead of one constitutional amendment, there
would have to be numerous amendments, each directed at a particular
decision. 62 The ballot pamphlet would contain arguments for and
against each of these decisions. It would be difficult for the voters to
understand all of this material.
Moreover, in the future, every time a California appellate court
relied on nonstatutory independent state grounds to exclude evidence,
it would be necessary to submit to the voters a new proposed constitu-
tional amendment overruling the decision. The formulation of such
amendments and their submission to the electorate would be a time-
consuming and expensive process. The state constitution soon would
become an unwieldy document, with most of its provisions aimed at
overruling specific decisions of the appellate courts.
Furthermore, no matter how egregious an appellate court decision
might be, the people of California would have to wait until a general
election before they could overturn the decision. In the meantime, the
decision would be binding on the trial courts. 163 The United States
Supreme Court would be unable to review the decision because the
California court's reliance on independent state grounds would pre-
clude such review.' 64
SCA 7 Would Exclude Evidence Admissible Under Current California Law
The United States Supreme Court, by exercising "its supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
160. But see note 121 supra.
161. SCA 7 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 4-5.
162. There are many decisions which have excluded evidence on nonstatutory in-
dependent state grounds. See notes 13-50, 80-85, 92-95, 100, 112-17 & accompanying text
supra.
163. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937,
939, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1962).
164. See notes 101-02 & accompanying text supra.
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courts," 
165 occasionally has fashioned exclusionary rules not required
by the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court lacks supervi-
sory authority over state courts, so these rules have not been binding on
California courts. Moreover, California courts have declined to follow
some of these rules.1 66 One commentator has argued that, under SCA
7, such rules might become binding on California courts, thereby re-
sulting in the suppression of evidence admissible under present Califor-
nia law.'
67
This argument, however, is without merit. SCA 7 provides that
evidence shall not be excluded unless "required" by the United States
Constitution. 68 Federal rules that have no constitutional basis, such as
those fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in the exercise of
its supervisory authority over federal courts, therefore would not be
binding on California courts under SCA 7.
SCA 7 Would Permit Strip Searches of Persons Who Violate Traffic Laws
One critic of SCA 7 has alleged that, if the amendment were
adopted, the police would be able to conduct routine strip searches of
persons subjected to lawful custodial arrest for traffic infractions. 69
This critic apparently has interpreted United States v. Robinson 170 and
Gustafson v. Florida'7' as authorizing such strip searches. 72 In these
cases, however, the police conducted a search only of the arrestees'
165. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S 332, 341 (1943).
166. For example, California courts have rejected the rule of McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), requiring the sup-
pression of a confession made in response to police interrogation during an unlawful delay
in arraignment. See People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 245, 578 P.2d 108, 116-17, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 869-70 (1978); Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 10, 291 P.2d 929, 933
(1955). In Rogers the court observed that the McNabb rule "'is not a limitation imposed by
the due process clause . . . . Compliance with the McNabb rule is required in federal
courts by [the Supreme Court] through its power of supervision over the procedure and
practices of federal courts in the trial of criminal cases.'" .d. at 9-10, 291 P.2d at 933 (quot-
ing Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951)).
167. Cleary, supra note 125, at 12.
168. See note 8 supra.
169. Smith, Are the State Courts Anti-Police?, L.A. Times, May 31, 1981, pt. IV, at 5, col.
3.
170. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
171. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). Robinson and Gustafson are discussed in text accompanying
notes 14-16 supra.
172. "[I]t is because of a 1973 opinion by Justice William H. Rehnquist that housewives
can be strip-searched following a traffic stop." Smith, Are the State Courts Anti-Police?, L.A.
Times, May 31, 1981, pt. IV, at 5, col. 3. The Robinson and Gustafson opinions were au-
thored by Justice Rehnquist in 1973.
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clothing while it was still being worn on their persons. 173 The police
did not conduct a strip search, and the court did not discuss the propri-
ety of a strip search incident to a custodial arrest for a traffic violation.
In Tinetti v. Wike174 a federal district court held that when the
police make a custodial arrest for a nonmisdemeanor traffic violation, a
routine strip search of the arrestee is unlawful. 175 The Tinetti court rea-
soned that a strip search is a significant intrusion into the personal dig-
nity of traffic violators, and there is little reason to suspect that such
violators will conceal contraband or weapons on their persons.176
Thus, it would be wrong to assume that the passage of SCA 7
would encourage the police routinely to strip search a person lawfully
arrested for a traffic infraction and taken into custody. Even when the
custodial arrest is for a misdemeanor traffic violation, Robinson and
Gustafson may not permit such a search. For example, in Logan v.
Sheaiy, 177 the Fourth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional for the
police routinely to strip search a person arrested and taken into custody
for the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving.
SCA 7 Would Repeal the State Constitutional Right to Privacy
It has been suggested that SCA 7 in effect would repeal the right to
privacy of article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. 178 SCA 7
would leave this right intact. It would preclude, however, invoking the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of this right when there
had been no invasion of privacy under the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Yet, in these circumstances other remedies
still may be available. The state constitutional right to privacy "is in-
tended .to be self-executing, i.e.,. . . the constitutional provision, in it-
self, 'creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every
Californian."' 179 A violation of the right to privacy, therefore, may
give rise to a cause of action for injunctive relief'80 or damages.18' The
173. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 262.
174. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980).
175. Id. at 491. The court failed to address the question whether strip searches are per-
missible when the arrest is for a misdemeanor traffic violation.
176. Id.
177. 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981).
178. See SCA 7 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 3; see also Cleary, supra note 125, at 2:
"[If SCA 7 is adopted,] the recent effort of the public on the right of privacy will have to be
reversed." Cleary characterizes the effort as "recent" because a 1974 constitutional amend-
ment added the right to privacy to article 1, § 1.
179. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106
(1975).
180. See id. at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
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passage of SCA 7 would not alter the "self-executing" nature of this
right.
SCA 7 Condones Unlawful Police Conduct
SCA 7 does not affect California constitutional law relating to the
legality of police conduct. 182 It has been suggested that the failure to
apply the exclusionary rule to police conduct that violates the Califor-
nia Constitution might be perceived as condoning such conduct.1
83
SCA 7 does not condone violations of the California Constitution.
With the exception of the remedy of exclusion, SCA 7 leaves intact
other remedies for such violations. The rationale underlying SCA 7 is
that, because the judicial decisions setting a more stringent standard
under the California Constitution are of questionable validity, 84 the
exclusion of evidence is too high a price to pay for a violation of this
stricter standard.
ACA 31: Administrative Certification of Police Agencies
The intent underlying ACA 31 is to establish an alternative to the
exclusionary rule that would adequately deter peace officers from en-
gaging in unlawful conduct. The search for such an alternative is not a
new development. Chief Justice Burger envisioned a statutory scheme
by which damages would be imposed for a violation of the fourth
amendment. 85 ACA 31 does not establish such a scheme. Rather, it
provides that evidence shall not be excluded as a remedy for a violation
of constitutional rights when the evidence has been obtained by a po-
lice agency that has been certified by a commission as having estab-
lished policies and programs sufficient to protect constitutional rights
and deter and control unlawful police conduct.
86
181. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 827, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 840 (1976).
182. See note 121 supra.
183. See SCA 7 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 4.
184. See notes 52-79 & accompanying text supra.
185. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Burger proposed that the remedy be "against the government it-
self to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated." Id.
186. See note 10 supra. Professor John Kaplan has proposed a somewhat similar
scheme. "The. . .proposed modification ... is to hold the exclusionary rule inapplicable
to cases where the police department in question has taken seriously its responsibility to
adhere to the fourth amendment. Specifically, departmental compliance would require a set
of published regulations giving guidance to police officers as to proper behavior in situations
such as the one under litigation, a training program calculated to make violations of fourth
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As the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule in the fourth
amendment context is to deter unlawful police conduct,'8 7 under ACA
31 there would be no need to apply the rule to fourth amendment vio-
lations by police agencies that had adopted such policies and programs.
These policies and programs would serve the same deterrent function
as the exclusionary rule. ACA 31, however, affords no guidance re-
garding what policies and programs would be sufficient.
Scope of ACA 31
ACA 31 would apply only to certified police agencies. The exclu-
sionary rule still would exclude evidence unlawfully obtained by non-
certified agencies. In addition, ACA 31 would have no effect upon the
court's holding in People v. Zelinski,'18 in which the California
Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to private security
guards.' 89 Thus, in contrast to SCA 7, which would nullify Zelinski's
precedential value,1 90 under ACA 31 security guards would remain
subject to the-exclusionary rule.
ACA 31 also would apply only when the exclusion of evidence
constituted a "remedy" based upon a violation of constitutional rights
and the evidence was "otherwise admissible."' 91 The term "otherwise
admissible" appears to mean that, but for the creation of a remedy for
the violation of constitutional rights, the evidence would have been ad-
missible. The amendment, therefore, would not permit the introduc-
tion of evidence when exclusion was based upon the violation of a
statute. In such a case, exclusion could not be construed as a remedy
based upon the violation of constitutional rights, -nor could the evi-
dence be characterized as "otherwise admissible." Some statutes' 92 ex-
amendment rights isolated occurrences, and, perhaps most importantly, a history of taking
disciplinary action where such violations are brought to its attention." Kaplan, The Limits of
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 1027, 1050-51 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
Unlike ACA 31, Professor Kaplan did not propose the creation of a commission to
certify police agencies that had established the requisite rules and regulations. Rather, he
indicated that if an unlawful search or seizure had occurred, the court would, at the request
of the prosecution, hold a hearing to determine whether the police department had estab-
lished and complied with adequate regulations. Id. at 1051.
187. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
188. 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979).
189. Id. at 368, 594 P.2d at 1006-07, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
190. SCA 7 would nullify Zelinski's precedential value because the exclusion of evi-
dence in Zelinski was based solely on the California Constitution. Id. at 368, 594 P.2d at
1007, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
191. See note 10 supra.
192. Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631-632 (West Supp. 1982). These statutes prohibit cer-
tain types of wiretapping and eavesdropping.
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pressly require the exclusion of any evidence obtained in violation of
their provisions. Other statutes 193 do not expressly require exclusion,
but the courts consistently have excluded evidence obtained in viola-
tion of their provisions.
1 94
In addition, ACA 31 would not apply when a judicially declared
rule of criminal evidence or procedure required exclusion, and the rule
could not be characterized as a remedy for a violation of constitutional
rights. ACA 31, therefore, would not affect People v. Jimenez,195 in
which the California Supreme Court held that a defendant's confession
is admissible only if the prosecution establishes the voluntariness of the
confession beyond a reasonable doubt. 196 Without relying on any con-
stitutional guarantees, the court concluded that the standard of proof
was required as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.
197
Moreover, ACA 31 would have no effect when the admission of
evidence would violate the California or federal privilege against self-
incrimination. The exclusion of such evidence could not be viewed as a
remedy for the violation of constitutional rights. Rather, the accused
would have a personal constitutional right to have the evidence ex-
cluded. The privilege against self-incrimination not only protects an
accused from being compelled to provide incriminating testimonial evi-
dence, but it also precludes the government from using such evidence
in a criminal proceeding against the accused. 198 In the fourth amend-
ment context, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule "is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
erally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
193. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 844, 1531 (West 1970). These statutes prescribe when
the police may forcibly enter a house for the purpose of making an arrest or executing a
warrant.
194. See Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 325, 461 P.2d 628, 635, 82 Cal. Rptr.
348, 355 (1969) (applying § 844); People v. Constancio, 42 Cal. App. 3d 533, 542, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 910, 915 (1974) (applying § 1531). Under SCA 7, evidence would be inadmissible
when exclusion was required by a statute. The bill (SB 1092) accompanying SCA 7, see note
8 supra, provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a
number of statutes, including §§ 631, 632, 844, and 1531. Thus, if both SCA 7 and the bill
were passed, evidence obtained in violation of these statutes would continue to be excluded.
195. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978). See notes 92-99 & accom-
panying text supra.
196. 21 Cal. 3d at 608, 580 P.2d at 679, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
197. Id. Jimenez is contrary to federal law. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489
(1971). See notes 97-99 & accompanying text supra. As no state statute has codified the
Jimenez standard of proof, SCA 7 would overrule Jimenez.
198. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964); People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 378, 605 P.2d 843,
848, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1980).
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right of the party aggrieved."
1 99
While there might be an alternative to the exclusionary rule in the
fourth amendment context if the alternative adequately deters unlawful
searches and seizures, there can be no alternative to the exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Even if a scheme were devised that adequately would deter the
police from violating the privilege, the privilege itself still would man-
date the exclusion of such evidence.
200
Furthermore, ACA 31 would not prevent the California Supreme
Court from excluding evidence on the ground that its admission would
violate the state confrontation clause,201 although the evidence was ad-
missible under federal law. For example, the court could declare Cali-
fornia Evidence Code section 1235202 unconstitutional under the state
constitution. This statute, which authorizes the admission of prior in-
consistent statements as substantive evidence, was declared constitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court.20 3 In People v. Chavez,2 4 a
four-justice majority of the California Supreme Court upheld its consti-
tutionality under the state constitution.20 5 The three dissenting justices
contended that the statute violated the state confrontation clause.20 6
If the California Supreme Court were to reconsider its decision in
Chavez and declare section 1235 unconstitutional on the ground that it
violated the state confrontation clause, certification of police agencies
199. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 33g, 348 (1974) (footnote omitted).
200. Accordingly, ACA 31 would not permit the admission of evidence excluded in Peo-
ple v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), and in People v.
Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978). In these cases, evidence
was excluded to protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See notes 40-50
& accompanying text supra. Disbrow and Pettingill conflict with federal law. See Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1970). As the
legislature has not codified Disbrow or Pettingill, SCA 7 would permit the admission of
evidence excluded by these decisions.
201. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 15.
202. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) provides: "Evidence of a statement made by
a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with
his testimony at the hearing and is in compliance with section 770."
CAL. EvD. CODE § 770 (West 1966) provides that evidence of an inconsistent statement
by a witness is to be excluded unless: "(a) The witness was so examined while testifying as
to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or (b) The witness has not
been excused from giving further testimony."
203. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
204. 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980).
205. Id. at 361, 605 P.2d at 418, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
206. Id. at 366, 605 P.2d at 421, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (Mosk, J., dissenting, joined by
Bird, C.J., and Newman, J.). Although the three dissenting justices remain on the court,
Justice Richardson is the only justice remaining who joined in the majority opinion.
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under ACA 31 would not circumvent the court's decision. The result-
ing exclusion of prior inconsistent statements could not be character-
ized as a remedy for a violation of constitutional rights; rather,
exclusion would be required to avoid such a violation. Thus, prior in-
consistent statements made to a certified agency would be inadmissible
as substantive evidence.
20 7
Criticisms of ACA 31
The scope of ACA 31 is too limited. Under ACA 31, the Califor-
nia courts would retain the authority to exclude evidence on nonstatu-
tory independent state grounds when exclusion was not a remedy for
the violation of constitutional rights or when evidence was obtained by
a person other than a member of a certified policy agency.
Furthermore, the implementation of ACA 31 would present many
problems. ACA 31 would require the Commission on Law Enforce-
ment to formulate standards for the certification of police agencies.
The Commission's task would be extremely complex. The standards
adopted by the Commission would have to ensure that the policies and
programs of certified agencies were sufficient to protect federal as well
as state constitutional rights. ACA 31 contains no guidelines to assist
the Commission in determining what policies and programs would be
sufficient. Moreover, as the law relating to the legality of police con-
duct changed, the Commission might have to modify its standards to
conform to the changes.
The Commission might require a single set of policies and pro-
grams for all certified police agencies. On the other hand, because of
the diversity of California police agencies and the communities that
they serve, such uniformity might be unsatisfactory. Policies and pro-
grams insufficient for one police agency might be sufficient for another.
For example, the Los Angeles City Police Department, which serves a
large, multiracial community with a serious crime problem, °20 may re-
quire different policies and programs from a police agency serving a
small, homogeneous, rural community in northern California with a
low crime rate. In addition, a small police department in a poor com-
207. As the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of section
1235, under SCA 7 the California Supreme Court would lack the authority to exclude evi-
dence admissible under the statute.
208. The number of offenses known by the police to have been committed during 1980
in the city of Los Angeles, with a population of 2,952,511, include: 1,010 murders and non-
negligent manslaughters, 2,813 forcible rapes, 25,637 robberies, and 86,525 burglaries. FED-
ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-
1980, at 90 (1981).
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munity may not be capable of meeting the same policies and programs
as the California Highway Patrol, which can draw on the state treasury
to finance its needs. Furthermore, because of their different law en-
forcement roles, policies and programs appropriate for the sheriff might
be inappropriate for the California Highway Patrol. The sheriff is prin-
cipally concerned with keeping the peace and apprehending persons
charged with crimes,20 9 whereas the primary function of the California
Highway Patrol is to enforce all laws regulating the operation of vehi-
cles and the use of state highways.210 If the Commission were to allow
different policies and programs to take into account the peculiar needs
of each police agency, the complexity of its task would be multiplied.
In any event, the complexity would be so great that it might take a
substantial amount of time for the Commission to formulate standards
and to certify police agencies. Indeed, in light of the heated debate that
the passage of ACA 31 may provoke, the Commission might be unable
to agree on the requisite standards.
21
Even if the Commission were able to reach agreement, the suffi-
ciency of the policies and programs of certified agencies would be sub-
ject to judicial review.212  In People v. Cahan,2 13 the California
Supreme Court stated that it was compelled to adopt the exclusionary
rule "because other remedies have completely failed to secure compli-
ance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers."214
The court could decide that the policies and programs of certified po-
lice agencies also were insufficient to protect rights guaranteed by the
California Constitution. The California Supreme Court, therefore, in
effect would have the power to veto the implementation of ACA 31.
209. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657, 83 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44
(1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26600-26602.
210. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 2400.
211. As ACA 31 does not specify the number of Commissioners who must agree in order
to reach a decision, see note 10 supra, a majority would suffice. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 12,
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 15.
212. The construction and application of a constitutional provision is a question of law
for the courts to decide. See Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 133, 173
P.2d 545, 549 (1946). The courts, therefore, would be the final arbiter of whether a certified
police agency's policies and programs were sufficient within the meaning of ACA 31. If the
courts determine that the policies and programs are sufficient, they still would have to decide
whether the amendment is constitutional under the United States Constitution. The analysis
,of ACA 31 by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice recognizes that "commission
standards and subsequent certification must pass judicial muster as to the sufficiency of al-
.ternate remedies or sanctions for safeguarding constitutional rights." CALIFORNIA ASSEM-
BLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS OF ACA 31, at 2 (July 6, 1981).
213. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
214. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
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If, on the other hand, the California Supreme Court believed that
the policies and programs of certified police agencies provided an ade-
quate alternative to the exclusionary rule, the court then would con-
front the charge that ACA 31 results in a denial of equal protection.
No police agency would be required to seek certification, and it may be
anticipated that there always would be some agencies that would not be
certified. Because defendants would receive different treatment de-
pending upon whether the evidence against them had been illegally
seized by a certified or noncertified policy agency, the implementation
of ACA 31 might violate the equal protection clauses of the United
States 215 and California21 6 constitutions.
If ACA 31 survived these hurdles, it would still be subject to the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Mapp v. Ohio.2 1 7 In Mapp,
the Court held that the United States Constitution compels the state
courts to exclude evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment.218 The California Supreme Court is constrained by the
supremacy clause219 to follow decisions of the United States Supreme
Court interpreting the United States Constitution.220 The California
Supreme Court, therefore, would have to declare ACA 31 unconstitu-
tional under the United States Constitution insofar as ACA 31 permit-
ted the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.2
21
There would be no assurance that the United States Supreme
Court would review a determination of the unconstitutionality of ACA
31. The United States Supreme Court has discretion to review deci-
sions of a state supreme court.222 If the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, it might reaffirm Mapp and, therefore, affirm the
California court's finding of unconstitutionality. Even if the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the constitutional-
ity of ACA 31, it probably would take years of litigation at both the
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
216. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
217. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
218. Id. at 655.
219. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1.
220. Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 3d 251, 258, 481 P.2d 489, 493, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 365 (1971).
221. If the California Supreme Court held that the policies and programs of a certified
police agency were sufficient to protect the rights guaranteed by the California Constitution,
then ACA 31 presumably would preclude the remedy of exclusion when it was based solely
on a violation of the California Constitution by that agency.
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). See note 125 supra.
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state and federal levels before this result would be achieved, during
which time the fate of ACA 31 would be uncertain.
It is possible, however, that the constitutionality of ACA 31 might
never be determined. If no police agency sought certification, there
would be no case to litigate. Knowing that the constitutionality of
ACA 31 is in doubt, California police agencies might not seek certifica-
tion. Certification would impose a burden upon a police agency to
adopt certain policies and programs. To constitute a sufficient deter-
rent against unlawful searches and seizures, the Commission would
have to impose severe sanctions upon the agency or the concerned of-
ficer for any illegal police conduct. A police agency might not be will-
ing to accept such sanctions without the assurance that ACA 31 would
be declared constitutional. Moreover, the policies and programs re-
quired by the Commission might be so harsh that no police agency
would seek certification regardless of the doubts about ACA 31's
constitutionality.
If the constitutionality of ACA 31 were litigated and upheld by the
United States Supreme Court, additional litigation regarding ACA 31
could continue. Whenever a prosecutor sought to admit evidence ille-
gally seized by a certified police agency, the defendant might be enti-
tled to a hearing on whether the policies and programs adopted by that
agency were sufficient to protect constitutional rights. Even when the
courts previously had upheld the sufficiency of those policies and pro-
grams, the defendant could contend that he had new evidence showing
that they were insufficient.223 If subsequently there had been a substan-
tial change in the law relating to the legality of police conduct, the de-
fendant could contend that, in light of this change, the courts should
reconsider the sufficiency of the agency's policies and programs. Fi-
nally, the defendant could argue that, assuming the policies and pro-
grams were sufficient, the police agency had failed to comply with
them.
On the other hand, one might interpret ACA 31 as not allowing
defendants to litigate the validity of certification each time the prosecu-
223. The courts, of course, on occasion do reverse prior decisions, as illustrated in Peo-
ple v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Despite a long line of authority rejecting
the exclusionary rule in California, in Cahan the California Supreme Court adopted the
rule. Id. at 442, 282 P.2d at 910. As the dissent noted, the court had "previously considered
practically every argument now advanced for the adoption of the so-called exclusionary rule
and [had] consistently determined that such arguments were outweighed by those advanced
in favor of the nonexciusionary rule." Id. at 452, 282 P.2d at 916 (Spence, J., dissenting). If
the courts upheld the sufficiency of a certified agency's policies and programs, the Chan
example might inspire defendants to continue to contest their sufficiency.
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tion sought to introduce evidence illegally obtained by a certified police
agency. Under this interpretation, the defendants' recourse would be
to seek decertification by the Commission. This recourse, however,
would merely transfer disputes from the courts to the Commission. In
addition, the losing party might be able to obtain review of the Com-
mission's decision in the appellate courts.
224
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court has misused its power to exclude
evidence on nonstatutory independent state grounds. The court has ex-
cluded evidence admissible under federal law, yet has failed to explain
why conditions peculiar to California justified imposing a more strin-
gent standard. By extending the exclusionary rule beyond federal re-
quirements, the court has made it more difficult, and in some instances
impossible, to convict criminal offenders whose guilt is undisputed.
Thus, the exclusion of evidence on nonstatutory independent state
grounds has had a harmful effect on the administration of justice in
California.
The court's practice of relying on both the federal and state consti-
tutions to exclude evidence also is unjustifiable. By following this prac-
tice, the court has insulated its interpretation of federal law from
review by the United States Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court also has followed an improper pro-
cedure when it has relied solely on the state constitution to exclude
evidence without first determining whether the evidence was admissi-
ble under federal law. If the court concludes that the United States
Constitution mandates exclusion, it is unnecessary for the court to con-
sider whether the state constitution compels the same result. If the evi-
dence is admissible under federal law, the court should not interpret
the state constitution as requiring its exclusion unless conditions pecu-
liar to California justify a different interpretation of that constitution.
By precluding the California Supreme Court from relying on non-
statutory independent state grounds to exclude evidence, SCA 7 would
halt the court's misuse of its power in this area. Furthermore, if in the
future the United States Supreme Court were to establish a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, SCA 7 would deny the California
224. The courts traditionally have the power to decide whether an administrative agency
abused its discretion, as well as to review the agency's determination of a question of law.
See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 325-327, 109
P.2d 935, 938-39 (1941); McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 748, 91 P.2d 1035, 1040
(1939).
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Supreme Court the means to circumvent the exception. Such a good
faith exception is appropriate, because the exclusionary rule can serve
no deterrent purpose when a police officer acts in the reasonable, good
faith, but mistaken, belief that his or her conduct does not violate the
fourth amendment.
Accordingly, SCA 7 would achieve meaningful and necessary re-
form of the exclusionary rule in California, and it should be adopted.
In contrast to SCA 7, ACA 31 falls short of being a meaningful reform
measure. It is too limited in scope, and its implementation would in-
volve great difficulties and consume a substantial amount of time. In-
deed, a number of legal obstacles might altogether bar the
implementation of ACA 31. ACA 31, therefore, cannot serve as a sub-
stitute for SCA 7.

